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A simple model shows that both price premiums and standardized block premiums (SBPs) are
biased measures of private benefits because they do not account for the transfer of control
effectively taking place with the block. This depends not only on the fractional size of the block,
but on the whole distribution of shareholdings. We propose an alternative methodology to measure
private benefits which makes it possible to weight the size of traded blocks on the basis of their
strategic power. We apply our method to a sample of Italian block transactions and show that the
traditional method underestimates control rents. The sensitivity of private benefits to net worth,
leverage, and nonvoting shares is also examined. Finally, we show how to forecast the price of out-
of-sample blocks of shares on the basis of information on company capital and ownership
structure.
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1. Introduction
The price of a voting share belonging to a negotiated block is usually higher than the
price of a share traded on the floor. This block premium has been usually attributed by the
corporate governance literature to the existence of private benefits from control. The latter
consist in unobservable consumption and investment opportunities deriving from discre-
tionary power to allocate company resources. Private benefits from control are often1057-5219/$ - see front matter D 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2004.02.006
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: nicodano@econ.unito.it (G. Nicodano).
G. Nicodano, A. Sembenelli / Int. Rev. Financ. Analy. 13 (2004) 227–244228assumed to accrue only to one controlling shareholder (or one manager) as long as he/she
has a significant share of the votes. For this reason, since the seminal work of Barclay and
Holderness (1989, BH thereafter), the average block premium in transactions exceeding a
given fraction of voting equity (5% in BH) has been considered as a measure of private
benefits from control.
In this paper, we show that this traditional measure leads to underestimate private
benefits unless the traded block transfers full control of the company. The underlying
intuition is very simple. A 5% block confers large control power—and therefore, a large
share of private benefits—in a firm with a large number of smaller shareholders. However,
it confers negligible power—and therefore, a trivial share of private benefits—when
another investor holds 51% of the votes. Thus, private benefits are well approximated by
the block premium in the first case, but are seriously underestimated in the second case. To
overcome this shortcoming, we propose an alternative methodology which builds on the
idea of Zwiebel (1995) that private benefits are divisible and that they are allocated to
each member of the controlling coalition according to his/her strategic power. Our
approach makes it possible to weight the size of traded blocks on the basis of their
strategic power, that is of the probability for each block to be pivotal in a voting contest
for achieving control of the company.
While it holds on theoretical ground, it might be argued that our claim has little
practical relevance. For this reason, we apply our methodology to a sample of block
transactions which occurred in Italy between 1987 and 1992 and we compare our
estimates of private benefits with block premiums. Our estimates show that average
(median) private benefits are equal to 27% (19%) of the value of voting equity while the
average (median) block premium equals 16.1% (2.1%) on blocks larger than 10%. These
empirical findings clearly show that the traditional method is likely to severely underes-
timate control rents.
The Italian case is interesting for two additional reasons. Firstly, the Italian governance
structure resembles that of many continental European and developing countries (Becht &
Roell, 1999; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999), in which large block-holders
either manage the firm directly or tightly monitor delegated managers.1 Secondly, average
private benefits in Italy were estimated to be far larger than in the United States and it was
suggested that this is due to the dilution of minority property rights in Italy (Zingales,
1994, 1995b). Our estimates confirm that private benefits in Italy are large. Yet our insight
suggests that private benefits in the United States might be seriously underestimated in the
literature due to the lower concentration of ownership.
The relevance of private benefits is related not only to their price impact but also to
their welfare effects. Insights on this issue can be gained by assuming that they are a1 Block shareholding is a common feature of corporate governance in the United States as well, and large
blocks of shares also tend to be passed on in negotiated transactions rather than fragmented (Shleifer & Vishny,
1986; Barclay & Holderness, 1989, 1991). However, there is a lower concentration of ownership. Moreover,
many block trades involve institutional investors—who usually refrain from influencing managerial choices—and
are much smaller. Keim and Madhavan (1996) and the literature pioneered by Scholes (1972) focus on the
information and liquidity impact on stock prices of these block transactions and overlook their negligible relations
with corporate control.
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These firm level characteristics have been put forward by the corporate governance
literature as potential determinants of control rents. In particular, it has been pointed out
that a larger proportion of nonvoting stock is associated with larger equilibrium control
rents, if they are obtained with the sacrifice of cash flows (Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi,
1998a). Our estimates show a positive association between private benefits and nonvoting
shares outstanding, indicating that their extraction reduces welfare.
Our estimates of the relation between control rents and firm characteristics can be
exploited to forecast the price of out-of-sample blocks on any size. On the contrary, the
traditional way of thinking about private benefits attaches a price premium only to the
largest block. We show that the per-share price premium on a minority block is
dramatically affected by ownership distribution, ranging in one example from 0% to
190%.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out our simple
pricing model. In Section 3, we briefly summarize the relationship between total control
rents and observable firm characteristics, as depicted by the corporate governance
literature. Section 4 describes the data, presents empirical results on the difference
between our method and the traditional one, and shows how to forecast out-of-sample
block prices. Section 5 concludes.2. Block premiums and partial benefits from control
In this section, we present a simple model of the block premium. The key assumption is
that the portion of private benefits accruing to a block investor depends on the strategic
importance of the investor’s block in forming controlling coalitions. Such strategic power
cannot in general be captured by the fractional size of the block, because it depends on the
distribution of shareholdings. For instance, a moderate-sized block confers large power in
a firm whose shares are held by many dispersed individuals but negligible power when
one investor holds an absolute majority position.
It is possible to capture such strategic importance with the power index of shareholder i,
ui. This quantifies his ability to change the outcome of voting contests by joining a losing
coalition and turning it into a winning one.2 Thus, a 5% block confers a power of 1/3 if
there are other two blocks each with 47.5% of the votes, and a power of 0 if there is a
block with 51%. We accordingly set control rents accruing to block-holder, i, equal to a
share, ui, of total control rents, C. We are therefore using the idea that private benefits are
divisible and are allocated according to the power index (Zwiebel, 1995) to study the
relation between private benefits and block premiums.
Several simplifying assumptions allow us to focus on voting power as the key
determinant of block premiums. Postulating investor’s risk neutrality and symmetric2 The Shapley and Shubik (1954) power index for a shareholder is calculated by considering each possible
coalition of shareholders and how frequently he can make a difference in the voting contest. It has already been
used for measuring ownership concentration (Leech, 1988), as well as compared with other measures of strategic
power (Felsenthal & Machover, 1998).
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assume that managers are induced to act, through monitoring and incentive contracts, in
the interest of the controlling shareholders. Finally, the stock market has an upstairs market
where blocks are transferred in bilateral negotiation and a multilateral exchange.4
2.1. Block price and market price
The amount received by a seller in a negotiated block transaction must be at least as
large as his or her valuation of the block. The seller must be compensated for the loss in
private benefits, which is proportional to the reduction in the power index, and for the loss
of pecuniary benefits, which increases with the number of shares in the block, NT. Let
us(usV) be the seller’s power index before (after) the transaction; q, the (per-share
discounted) company profits; and P, the price paid for one share in the block. Then:
PNTzðus  usVÞC þ qNT ð1Þ
The buyer’s valuation of the block, in turn, cannot be smaller than the sum paid for the
block:
PNTVðubV ubÞC þ qNT ð2Þ
where ub(ubV) is the buyer’s power index before (after) the transaction.
The exchange price of common shares after the transaction, PeV, should similarly depend
on the valuation of the shares by those investors who trade on the floor—the ‘‘outsiders’’.
Thus, PeVequals expected control rents plus pecuniary benefits accruing to outsiders:
PeVNoVu/VC þ qNoV ð3Þ
where NoV is the number of common shares held by them and /V is their fraction of total
control rents after the block transaction.
Eq. (3) allows for outside shareholders’ strategic power. This assumption is not crucial
for Proposition 1, which goes through when /V= 0. However, /V>0 is consistent with
evidence showing that common shares trade at a premium relative to nonvoting shares in
several countries (Lease, McConnell, & Mikkelson, 1983; Modigliani & Perotti, 1998;
Rydquist, 1992). Indeed, it has been suggested that the value of control rents is reflected in
the exchange price of a vote in proportion to outsiders’ strategic power, and that this
proportion may change when an event modifies the distribution of ownership (Zingales,
1994 for Italy; Zingales, 1995b for the United States).3 When traders are risk neutral and there is no asymmetric information, market liquidity is infinite. In other
words, the demand for shares is infinitely elastic at a price equal to the expected cash flow, discounted at the risk-
free rate (O’Hara, 1995).
4 We do not address traders’ choice between negotiation, public tender offer, or trading in the market.
Motivation for negotiated block trading is offered by Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998b), Shleifer and Vishny
(1986) and Zingales (1995a).
2.2. The block premium
The block premium which is observed after a transaction is equal to (PPeV)NT. It can
be obtained by combining previous equations:
v¯sCVðP  PeVÞNTVv¯bC ð4Þ
where v¯su us  usV
/VNT
NoV
 
and v¯bu ubV ub 
/VNT
NoV
 
The block premium increases with the voting power lost (acquired) by the seller
(buyer), assuming positive control rents, C, and a given distribution of bargaining power
between the seller and the buyer. It decreases with outsiders’ voting power, because the
latter raises the market price. It is now straightforward to relate control benefits to the price
premium, ((PPeV)/PeV), or the standardized block premium (SBP):
SBP ¼ ðP  PeVÞN
T
EV
ð5Þ
where EV=PeVNeV is the market value of voting equity and NeV is the number of voting
shares after the transaction. We can divide all terms in Eq. (4) by EV, so as to obtain bounds
on the value of the SBP:
v¯s
C
EV
VSBPVv¯b
C
EV
ð6Þ
We obtain bounds on the price premium if we multiply all terms by (NeV)/(NT):
v¯s
C
EV
NeV
NT
V
ðP  PeVÞ
PeV
Vv¯b
C
EV
NeV
NT
ð7Þ
Because the seminal work of Barclay and Holderness (1989), the ratio of private
benefits to (voting) equity has been approximated with either the SBP or the price
premium.
The proposition below establishes the exact relationship between the three:
Proposition 1. (a) The SBP underestimates the ratio of control benefits to equity, (C/EV),
unless the traded block transfers full control of the company. (b) The price premium may
over- or underestimate such ratio. If the block transfers full control of the company, the
price premium overestimates (C/EV) by a factor which is equal to the number of
outstanding shares divided by the number of shares in the block.
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case, Eq. (6) becomes: SBP= v¯b(C/EV). Dividing both sides by v¯b we obtain the ratio of
control benefits to equity as a function of the SBP: (C/EV)=(SBP)/(v¯b). But v¯bV 1.
Control benefits are thus larger than the SBP in general. Only if a majority controlling
block is traded, the seller transfers all voting power to the buyer and consequently,
outsiders have no power. In this case, we can impose (ususV)=(ubVub) = 1 and
/ =/V= 0 into v¯buðubV ub  /VN
T
NoVÞ, obtaining v¯b = 1. Only in this situation do control
benefits coincide with the SBP. This proves the first part of the proposition.
From Eq. (7), we obtain C
EV¼ ðPPVeÞPVe N
T
NeV¯vb if the seller has all the bargaining power. The
product N
T
NeV¯vb can be greater or lower than 1 because (N
T)/(NeV)V 1 and (1)/(v¯b)z 1. When
a majority controlling block is traded, v¯b is equal to 1, and the price premium
overestimates (C)/(EV) by a factor equal to the inverse of (NT)/(NeV). This proves (b). 5
This is the key insight of our model. The implication of Proposition (1a) is that the
lower the strategic power of traded blocks, the more the SBPs underestimate control
benefits. In Barclay and Holderness (1989), control benefits are set equal to the SBP for
blocks with fractional size exceeding 5%. In other words, ui is implicitly set equal to 1
if the fractional size of the block exceeds 5% and equal to 0 otherwise. A 5% block is
unlikely to transfer full control power, however, hence control benefits are likely to be
underestimated.
This observation is also important when comparisons of private benefits across
countries are carried out (as in Dyck & Zingales, 2004), if countries under analysis are
characterized by different ownership structures. For instance, ownership structure is
concentrated in several continental European and developing countries while it is
dispersed in Anglo-Saxon countries. It follows that private benefits suffer from a larger
underestimate in countries with minority controlling blocks, such as the United States or
the United Kingdom, when the inference is based on transactions premiums involving
control blocks.
2.3. Extensions
We now allow for a difference between post- and pre-transaction company profits. The
upper and lower bounds for the value of the block become:
ðus  usVÞC þ qNT þ ðq qVÞNsVVPNTVðubV ubÞC þ qVNT þ ðqV qÞNb ð8Þ
The term ( q qV)NsVshows that the seller’s valuation is affected by pecuniary losses
or gains proportional to the NsV shares that are retained by the seller after the
transaction. Similarly, (qV q)Nb indicates that the buyer’s valuation increases if
pecuniary gains attach to the initial toehold, Nb, as a consequence of the block
purchase.
The market price of common shares after the transaction is equal to:
PeVNoVu/VC þ qVNoV ð9Þ
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vsC  ðqV qÞvsVSBPVvbC þ ðqV qÞvb ð10Þ
where vsu
v¯s
EV
; vbu
v¯b
EV
; vsu
NsVþ NT
EV
; vbu
NbV
EV
ð11Þ
Hence, private benefits differ from the block premium because of both the effects
mentioned in Proposition 1 and the expected change in company profits. In the Empirical
analysis section, we will therefore estimate both control rents, C, and the change in cash
flows, qV q, by applying Eq. (10) to our sample of block transaction premiums. As
explained in the next section, we will also parameterize C as a function of observables to
derive further insights on the determinants of private benefits.3. Control rents, pecuniary benefits and capital structure
The corporate governance literature relates control rents to the size of company assets,
because larger firms potentially offer greater nonpecuniary (and pecuniary) benefits
(Barclay & Holderness, 1989). Assets can be increased by resorting to both debt and
equity financing. We could therefore expect a positive correlation of control rents with
both debt and net worth. However, corporate debt may reduce private benefits by
constraining managerial discretion through both restrictive covenants and the obligation
to pay out future cash flows (Harris & Raviv, 1988). It follows that the effect of debt on
control rents is uncertain while net worth is expected to have an unambiguous positive
correlation with control rents.
The extraction of private benefits is socially inefficient if US$1 of private benefits
requires the sacrifice of more than US$1 of cash flow. The incentive to refrain from
inefficient rent extraction increases in the portion of cash flow that the controlling coalition
is entitled to. The larger the ratio of nonvoting shares to voting shares outstanding, the
smaller are both the cash-flow rights that the controlling coalition must own to keep
control and the incentive to correct inefficient self-serving choices (Burkart et al., 1998a).5
A larger proportion of nonvoting stock should therefore be associated with larger
equilibrium control rents, if they are inefficient.
Monitoring block-holders are often managers who derive satisfaction from on-the-job
consumption, while outside shareholders derive no utility from on-the-job consumption.
Thus, independent members of the board, who represent outside shareholders, are usually
willing to reduce the control rents enjoyed by delegated managers. This reasoning implies
that outsiders’ power index, /, is expected to be negatively correlated with control rents
and positively with per-share profits, q (Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997).5 An example of rent extraction which reduces cash flows is hiring a lazy relative. Hiring a relative provides
control benefits but is not inefficient if his or her ability and effort are comparable to those available in the market.
G. Nicodano, A. Sembenelli / Int. Rev. Financ. Analy. 13 (2004) 227–244234These observations lead us to the following specifications for control rents:
C ¼ a1ðnet worthÞ þ a2ðleverageÞ þ a3 nonvoting equity
voting equity
 
þ a4/ þ u ð12Þ
and for the change in per-share profits:
qV q ¼ b1ð/V /Þ þ uV ð13Þ
where u and uVare error terms with standard properties and / measures outsiders’ strategic
importance. The above arguments imply that a1 and a3 are expected to be positive. The
sign of a2 is uncertain because leverage permits increasing the amount of assets under
control, but on the other hand, it limits the controlling party’s discretion in allocating such
assets. We also expect a4 to be negative and b1 to be positive if control rents fall when
outsiders’ strategic importance increases. In the empirical analysis, Eqs. (12) and (13) are
substituted in Eq. (10), to recover firm specific estimates of both private benefits and the
expected change in company profits.4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Data
Our sample consists of 94 block transactions in the shares of 64 Italian-listed
manufacturing companies between 1987 and 1992. In this sample, we expect no influence
of both tender offer regulation and market design on block prices. Enforcement of takeover
regulation and trading restrictions were almost nonexistent in the years of our empirical
analysis. In the Milan upstairs market, there was nothing like the NYSE obligation to
‘‘clear the book;’’ nor were there rules concerning maximum deviations from market
prices, such as those prevailing in Paris or Brussels. Moreover, there were neither
disclosure provisions on takeover bids nor compulsory public tender offers as in France
(Eckbo & Langhor, 1989) and Belgium (Van Hulle, Vermaelen, & De Wouters, 1991).6
For each transaction, the number of shares and the price, the names of the company and
of block traders come from the commercial directory Data on Mergers and Acquisitions
published by Nomisma, an Italian consulting firm. The date of announcement of the
transaction to the public and further information on block prices were retrieved from the
business newspaper Il Sole-24 Ore. Daily exchange prices were collected from 120 days
before to 120 days after the announcement. Balance-sheet data come from the directory
Taccuino dell’Azionista, and refer to capital structure before the transaction. Our original
sample consists of 545 transactions. We exclude 344 observations that were either within-
group transactions or cases when the announcement was missing or incomplete. For the
remaining observations, in 41 cases, the exchange price was missing (because the6 Beginning in January 1992, block size and prices had to be disclosed within 1 h of the transaction.
Regulators also set a (small) lower bound on the size of blocks that were allowed in the upstairs market.
Mandatory tender offer requirements were enacted in August 1992, but not enforced until much later.
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cases, the block price had not been reported; in 8 cases we could not identify the seller or
the buyer. After eliminating 5 extreme observations, we retained 121 observations, 94 of
them involving manufacturing companies.7
Our estimation method requires further data collection relative to previous work on
block transaction premiums, in that we need information on ownership structure. As noted
earlier, the Italian ownership structure is institutionally characterized by the presence of
both majority shareholders and controlling coalitions of smaller block-holders. The
separation of cash-flow rights from control rights is allowed and widespread, achieved
by both the issue of nonvoting shares and the creation of a hierarchy of companies—a
pyramidal business group—controlled at the top by a holding company.8 This last feature
requires special care in measuring voting shares, as it is necessary to consolidate
shareholdings that are controlled by the same shareholder through the pyramid. The
distribution of shareholdings before and after the transaction comes mainly from the
directory Taccuino dell’Azionista, supplemented by the R&S directory and the Archivio
Sperimentale delle Partecipazioni database provided by Banca d’Italia-Consob. Our data
sources identify the top shareholders and the size of their holdings. Typically, top
shareholders are either the majority shareholder or the members of controlling coalitions,
complemented by other large (>1%) block-holders. We set outsiders’ share equal to the
difference between the total number of voting shares and the sum of the top shareholders’
holdings.
Knowing both their identity and their shareholdings, we calculate the voting power
indexes for buyers, sellers, and outsiders using an algorithm described in Gambarelli
(1996). We then compute v¯s and v¯b, which measure the transfer of voting power implied in
the block transaction relative to the voting power of one share traded by outsiders.
4.2. Descriptive statistics
Below, we measure both price premium and SBP and analyze how they vary with the
size of the transaction, which averages 20.4% of voting shares. We also compare price
premiums in our sample to those found by BH.9
The average per-share price in the block is 27.4% higher than the posttransaction
market price (Table 1).
As expected, the premium is larger when larger blocks are traded. When the block
contains more than 10% of voting shares, the average premium is 31.1%, whereas for
blocks smaller than 10%, it falls to 23.6%. The quartile distributions yield further7 Extreme observations are defined as those observations for which the price premium is greater than 3 or
smaller than  0.75. In other words, observations are excluded if the price paid for one share in the block is more
than four times or less than one quarter than the corresponding market price observed after the transaction has
occurred.
8 These features are common to a number of industrial and developing countries, primarily not part of the
Anglo-American legal tradition (La Porta et al., 1999).
9 For detailed studies of control transfers in listed Italian companies, see Caprio and Floreani (1996) for
1970–1991 and Bianchi, Casavola, and Cipolletta (1996) for 1990–1995.
Table 1
Post- transaction premiums
Cases Mean (S.D.) First quartile Median Third quartile
Price premium
Full sample 94 0.274 (0.637)  0.029 0.083 0.327
Blocksz 0.10 48 0.311 (0.604)  0.023 0.121 0.434
Blocks < 0.10 46 0.236 (0.674)  0.034 0.068 0.158
Standardized block premium (SBP)
Full sample 94 0.087 (0.221)  0.002 0.005 0.057
Blocksz 0.10 48 0.161 (0.290)  0.003 0.021 0.229
Blocks < 0.10 46 0.011 (0.032)  0.001 0.002 0.007
This table shows descriptive statistics for the price premium, defined as ( PPeV/PeV) and the standardized block
premium, defined as SBP ¼ ðPPeVÞNT
EV . The symbol P denotes the price paid for a share in the block, PeV(EV) is the
market value of a (all) common share(s) after the transaction and NT is the number of shares traded in the block.
The market price after the transaction is computed as an average of daily prices in the interval [t + 7, t+ 30] where
t is the announcement date. Both premiums are reported for the whole sample as well as for blocks larger–equal
than or smaller than 10% of common shares.
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suggesting that the distributions are positively skewed with a limited number of blocks
commanding a very high premium. This explains why we also make use of median values
to perform our simulations in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. Furthermore, first quartiles are always
negative, implying that there is a nontrivial number (30.9%) of cases where the block is
traded below the market price. This result also holds when only large blocks are
considered. Finally, third quartiles look high, both in absolute and in relative terms
(43.4%) for the subsamples including only larger blocks. As expected, it is here that a
significant number of large premiums can be found. By comparison, BH had a sample
with a lower mean and a higher median price premium (20.4% and 15.7%, respectively),
and 20% of blocks traded at a discount to the post- announcement exchange price. Our
mean SBP is also larger (8.7%) than BH’s estimate (4.2%). Note that 8.7% is the estimate
of private benefits from control in Italian companies according to BH’s method, which sets
private benefits equal to block transaction premiums.
In our restricted model (Eq. (4)), block premiums are entirely due to transfers of voting
power alone. It is thus reassuring to observe that block transactions transfer large voting
power in our sample. Table 2 shows that the seller’s mean power index is almost cut in half
(from 0.529 to 0.279) while the buyer’s rises dramatically (from 0.040 to 0.326). This isTable 2
Pre- and post- transaction voting powers (VP) for sellers, buyers, and outsiders
Mean (S.D.)
Seller’s voting power (us and usV) 0.529 (0.471) 0.279 (0.424)
Buyer’s voting power (ub and ubV) 0.040 (0.146) 0.326 (0.446)
Outsiders’ voting power (/ and /V) 0.167 (0.319) 0.136 (0.300)
This table reports the average voting power of block sellers (first row), of block buyers (second row), and of
outsiders (third row). The second and third columns measure voting power before and after the transaction,
respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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in more concentrated ownership in our sample.
It will be recalled that v¯i (with i= s,b) measures the transfer of voting power relative to
the outsiders’ voting power. Eq. (4) implies that v¯s should not exceed v¯b if a transaction has
taken place, otherwise the seller’s valuation of the block would exceed the buyer’s. Table 3
reports information on v¯i (with i = s,b) to check whether this prediction is borne out by the
data. It is reassuring to observe that v¯s is on average not greater than v¯b. It is indeed smaller
even if the difference is not significant at conventional statistical levels. Furthermore,
Table 3 also shows there are several cases (42 or 36, depending on the seller’s or the
buyer’s valuation) in which minority blocks are traded in majority-controlled companies
(v¯i= 0) and a few (13 or 15) in which minority blocks are traded in companies where
outsiders’ power index is positive (v¯i< 0).
Finally, Table 4 reports the mean values of all the accounting figures later used to
approximate unobservable private benefits. We refer the reader to the legend of Table 4 for
details on each variable, and just note here that the ratio of nonvoting to voting shares
looks on average rather small (14.4%). Not all firms issue nonvoting shares, however, and
for those that do, the average ratio is high (30.8%).
4.3. Private benefits: the role of company size and capital structure
To measure private benefits, we rely on estimates of the parameters in Eq. (10), having
substituted Eq. (12) for unobservable control rents, C, and Eq. (13) for the change in
company profits, qV q. Because we cannot observe bargaining power, our strategy
consists in regressing the SBP on the seller’s and the buyer’s valuation independently—
which represent the left- and the right-hand side of Eq. (10), respectively. In summary, we
estimate the coefficients as and bs in the equations:
SBP ¼ a1vsðnet worthÞ þ a2vsðleverageÞ þ a3vs nonvoting equity
voting equity
 
þ a4vs/  b1vsð/V /Þ þ es ð14Þ
SBP ¼ a1vbðnet worthÞ þ a2vbðleverageÞ þ a3vb nonvoting equity
voting equity
 
þ a4vb/  b1vbð/V /Þ þ eb ð15Þ
with es ¼ vsu vsuVand eb ¼ vbuþ vsuV
after having computed the values for vs, vb, vs, and vb. Estimating the same specification
twice, on the basis of the seller’s and the buyer’s valuation, respectively, provides an
additional check on the robustness of our empirical findings which, as we will see, are
similar across the two regressions.
Table 3
Relative voting power
Mean S.D. Number of cases
v¯i< 0 v¯i= 0 v¯i>0
Seller’s relative voting power (v¯s) 0.219 0.409 13 42 39
Buyer’s relative voting power (v¯b) 0.253 0.426 15 36 43
This table reports the voting power of one share belonging to the block relative to the voting power of one share
held by outsiders. The power of the block is assessed with respect to the seller’s power ½v¯suðus  usV ð/VNT
=NoVÞÞ in the second row, and to the buyer’s power v¯buðubV ubV /VN
T
NoV Þ
h i
in the third row. The block size is NT
while uiV, /V, and NoV, respectively, denote the power of the block traders, outsiders’ power, and their holdings of
common shares after the transaction.
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Firstly, we limit our analysis to post- announcement premiums because the exchange
price should then incorporate new information on profitability (Barclay & Holderness,
1989). Secondly, the market price is averaged to reduce the impact of idiosyncratic
liquidity shocks. The dependent variable is thus an average of the standardized premium
over Days + 7 to + 30 after the announcement. Regression results do not significantly
change when the average is taken over Days + 1 to + 7. Premiums are however smaller
when measured from t + 1 to t + 7 because there is a temporary price increase around the
announcement of the block transaction. Thirdly, we compute standard errors using
White’s consistent estimator of the covariance matrix because heteroskedasticity in the
residuals cannot be rejected.
Our econometric results are presented in Table 5. Company net worth as well as
nonvoting equity have a positive sign and are statistically significant in all equations. The
first result (a1>0) is consistent with previous findings by BH showing that control rents
increase with controlled assets. We also investigated whether pyramiding increases private
benefits by substituting consolidated net worth and debt to the corresponding company
figures, following Nicodano (1998). However, company figures turn out to have higher
explanatory power.
The positive coefficient attached to nonvoting equity (a3>0) lends support to the
hypothesis that the extraction of private benefits is inefficient and dilutes outside
shareholders’ property rights. This evidence could be reinforced by the observation of
a negative correlation between the amount of the controlling coalition’s investment and
private benefits, as suggested by Burkart et al. (1998b). However, we cannot measureTable 4
Balance sheet and ownership data (descriptive statistics)
Mean First quartile Median Third quartile
Net worth (billions of lire) 407.0 54.7 171.1 439.6
Leverage (%) 69.7 8.1 38.4 84.9
Nonvoting/voting shares (%) 14.4 0.0 0.0 17.3
This table reports descriptive statistics for net worth (first row), leverage (second row), and the ratio of nonvoting
to voting shares (third row). Net worth is the sum of the value of outstanding shares and other reserves. Leverage
is the ratio of financial debt to net worth. Both figures are computed using book values.
Table 5
Determinants of block premiums and private benefits
Explanatory variables Parameters Seller’s valuation (Eq. (11)) Buyer’s valuation (Eq. (12))
vi (Net worth) a1 0.362(0.108)*** 0.339(0.093)***
vi (Leverage) a2 0.005(0.005) 0.007(0.004)*
vi (Nonvoting/voting shares) a3 1.510(0.289)* 1.661(0.340)***
vi (Outsiders’ voting power) a 4  0.189(0.128)  0.217(0.082)***
vi (D Outsiders’ voting power)  b1  0.551(0.361)
vi (D Outsiders’ voting power) b1 1.062(0.512)**
Adjusted R2 0.427 0.490
F statistic 18.33[4] 23.34[4]
Breusch–Pagan test 57.81[4] 45.68[4]
Estimates of private benefits (C/EV)
Mean (%) 28.27 27.01
Median (%) 20.25 19.00
The upper part of this table reports econometric estimates of Eq. (13) and of Eq. (14), with the SBP as dependent
variable. The first column lists explanatory variables, and the subscript indicates the seller (s) or the buyer (b). The
second column lists the parameter to be estimated, while the third and fourth columns report estimates with
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity in round bracket. The adjusted R2, F test, and Breusch–Pagan test
follow, with degrees of freedom in square brackets. The lower part of the table reports estimates of mean and
median private benefits relative to the value of common shares.
*Statistical significance at 10%.
**Statistical significance at 5%.
***Statistical significance at 1%.
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coalitions are not available.
The coefficient of leverage (a2) turns out to be positive and statistically marginally
significant in the specification based on the buyer’s valuation. Yet, it is so small that
the influence of leverage on private benefits must be considered negligible. This
neutrality of debt can be ascribed to its two-edged nature, as discussed in Section 3: it
permits the acquisition of more assets without losing control, but at the same time, it
limits discretion in allocating them. Again, this is consistent with previous findings by
BH.
Control rents are negatively correlated with outsiders’ power index, suggesting that
the extraction of private benefits is curbed by outsiders’ monitoring. Moreover, the
expected change in profits is positively correlated with an increase in outsiders’ voting
power. This supports the idea that their relevance increases pecuniary benefits. Let us
emphasize that outside shareholders in our sample are those who are not considered as
the top shareholders by our data sources. Hence, they do not necessarily coincide with
the atomistic shareholders of the corporate control literature.
Similar results hold when the sample is extended to include banks and insurance
companies. We also ran additional regressions after including industry and/or time
dummies to control for time-invariant, industry-specific and general business cycle
effects. In all cases, these variables were statistically insignificant. For reason of space,
we do not report these results.
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In this section, we recover estimates of control rents for our sample on the basis of Eq.
(10) and the estimated as in Table 5.
Estimates of average private benefits can be recovered by using data on corporate
financial structure in our sample. The estimates based on mean values of all independent
variables (27–28% of the value of voting equity, see Table 5) by far exceed our average
block premiums (8.7% for all blocks and 16.1% for blocks larger than 10%, see Table
1). This empirically confirms that block premiums are unreliable measures of private
benefits. Surprisingly, mean control rents coincide with our mean price premium in
Table 1. This is however pure coincidence, because, as we showed in Section 2, price
premiums may under- or overestimate private benefits even when the expected change in
profits is equal to 0. This coincidence disappears when we focus on estimates based on
median values of all independent variables. Indeed, the median price premium falls to
8.3%, while the median private benefit equals 19–20%.
We propose a simulation, based on the buyer’s valuation, to assess how changes in
capital structure influence private benefits. In Table 6, we report estimates for
alternative values of both the nonvoting/voting equity ratio and leverage, while holding
the other explanatory variables to their sample medians. For instance, private benefits
increase from 19.0% to 46.5% of the market value of voting shares as the portion of
nonvoting equity rises from 0 (first decile) to 0.51 (ninth decile), while leverage is
kept to its median value. As already anticipated, the sensitivity to leverage is much
smaller.
4.5. The size of private benefits: comparison across estimation techniques in Italy and the
United States
We now compare our estimates of private benefits to alternative ones based on the
voting share premium in Italy. We also use the insight provided by Proposition 1 to discuss
existing estimates for the United States.Table 6
Private benefits simulations for different financial structures (%)
Nonvoting/voting shares
Percentiles 10 25 50 75 90
Leverage 10 18.91 18.91 18.91 28.27 46.44
25 18.93 18.93 18.93 28.30 46.46
50 19.00 19.00 19.00 28.37 46.53
75 19.11 19.11 19.11 28.47 46.63
90 19.26 19.26 19.26 28.63 46.79
This table computes the distribution of private benefits for firms characterized by different combinations of
leverage and of the ratio of nonvoting to voting shares. Percentiles are drawn from the actual distribution of
these two financial variables in our sample. Simulations are based on the estimated parameters for buyer’s
valuation.
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(1994), who obtained them using both a different sample and another estimation
technique.10 This may appear comforting at first sight, because they are based on two
very different samples: our method selects companies which experienced block trans-
actions, while he selects companies with nonvoting shares outstanding. Hence,
complementary methods seem to give converging results. Unfortunately, this is not
completely true because the mean fraction of nonvoting shares in our sample is 14.4,
while it equals 34.9% in his sample. Our implied estimates of private benefits (using
mean values for comparability) for such a company would then be 32–33%. Clearly,
other less obvious differences in the two samples may reconcile the two estimates. At
present, this comparison only confirms that estimated private benefits in Italy are
large.11
Estimates for the United States are usually found to be lower in the literature. For
instance, BH set private benefits equal to the block premium which in turn is 4.22% of the
value of equity. On the basis of our analysis, we conjecture that private benefits are a
multiple of this figure. Indeed, their blocks are unlikely to transfer full control given that
the percentage of common stocks traded ranges from 6.6% to 63% (with a mean of
20.7%), and given the frequency distribution of fractional ownership they report in Table 1
(p. 377).
4.6. Forecasting the price of out-of-sample control blocks
Eq. (10) can be used to price a block of shares of any fractional size if a block-holder
is interested in knowing the value of her stake before a negotiation begins. The
traditional way of thinking about private benefits only allowed to price the largest
block in a given company, because it was thought that smaller blocks only provided an
uncertain opportunity to gain control—which is hard to measure.
Pricing requires an estimate of private benefits for the company under consideration.
We now show how estimates obtained in the previous section can be translated into an
implied per-share premium, given the size of the block and ownership distribution. For
simplicity, we maintain the assumption that traders have equal ability to both extract
private benefits and manage the company.
Pricing is straightforward when the block that will be traded consists of slightly over
50% of common stock. In this special case, the seller’s and the buyer’s valuations
coincide and no particular distribution of bargaining power need be posited to derive10 He finds private benefits equal to 29.2% of pecuniary benefits. Comparison of estimates can be performed
as follows. The value of voting shares E is equal to V +CPnvNnv where V is the amount of pecuniary benefits
and the subscript nv refers to nonvoting shares. Hence, (C/PeNe)=(1+(V)/(C))
 1(1+( PnvNnv))/(E)).Using
estimates that can be retrieved from his paper (C/(V) = 0.292; ( Pnv/Pe) = 0.551, and (Nnv/Ne) = 0.349), we obtain
(C/PeNe) = 0.269. Estimated private benefits are therefore slightly larger in our sample than in Zingales’.
11 High private benefits are ascribed—by the recent governance literature—to separation of control rights
from cash-flow rights and/or weak legal protection of outside shareholders. Stricter regulation aimed at investors’
protection began to be enforced in Italy after the sample period.
Table 7
The per-share premium of a 5% block in three hypothetical firms
Size (number) of blocks Price premium (%)
Firm A 51 (1) 5 (9) 4 (1) 0
Firm B 46 (1) 44 (1) 5 (2) 126.7
Firm C 46 (2) 5 (1) 3 (1) 190.0
This table reports in the third column the simulated price premium for a 5% block to three hypothetical firms.
Such firms are characterized by a different ownership distribution, which is described in the second column. For
instance, Firm B has one block commanding 46% of votes, one block commanding 44%, and two blocks with 5%
of votes. In the computation of the price premium, private benefits C are set equal to our median estimate (19%).
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price premium:
P  PeV
PeV
¼ vi CNeV
EVNT
ð16Þ
Unobservable control rents, C, are set equal to the value estimated for companies that
have similar net worth, leverage, proportion of nonvoting shares, etc., while vi, EV, and NeV
are observable characteristics of the company under consideration. If this company has the
median capital structure, then Table 6 shows that total private benefits should be equal to
C = 19.0%. This figure must be substituted in Eq. (16), together with the actual data from
the company, namely, vi= 1 and (NeV/NT) = 2, thus obtaining a price premium of 38.0%. The
premium would be much higher if the company had the top 10% proportion of nonvoting
shares, rather than the median, because 19.0% would have to be replaced with 46.5%.
When the block does not control the absolute majority of votes, information on relative
bargaining power must be used because it is possible for seller’s and buyer’s valuations to
diverge. Moreover, ownership distribution dramatically affects the size of the premium.
An extreme example—assuming that bargaining power is equal for the two players—is
offered in Table 7, where the per-share premium attaching to a 5% block is related to the
pre- transaction distribution of ownership in three hypothetical companies. In Firm A, the
premium is obviously 0, because the top shareholder already owns the majority of votes.
In Firms B and C, the premiums are large because the traded block is strategically
important. The increasing size of the premium is explained by the greater probability of the
block’s being pivotal in the case of Firm C. This example suggests the relevance of relying
on voting power rather than on the fractional size of the block, as the price premium on a
5% block may vary from 0% to 190% depending only on ownership structure.5. Summary and conclusions
We have shown that average premiums in block transactions exceeding a certain
fractional size do not measure private benefits. A simple model has indeed highlighted
conditions ensuring that block premiums understate the size of private benefits unless 51%
of votes are transferred. Econometric results confirm that such understatement is
empirically relevant (16.1% instead of 27%). We are able to avoid this problem by
G. Nicodano, A. Sembenelli / Int. Rev. Financ. Analy. 13 (2004) 227–244 243accounting for the strategic importance of the block, which depends on the distribution of
shareholdings.
Private benefits in Italy turn out to be a large proportion of the value of voting equity,
especially with respect to the United States. While part of this difference may be ascribed
to worse investor protection, it is likely that accounting for the voting power of the traded
block would result in an upward revision of the estimate for the United States.
Econometric estimates of the sensitivity of private benefits to capital structure can be
used to forecast the price of blocks that are not part of the original sample. We provide an
example, showing that the same 5% block can indeed be traded at a price premium which
ranges from 0% to 190.0%, depending on the distribution of shareholdings. Our example
suggests that the fractional size of the block can be a very misleading indicator of strategic
relevance, and therefore, of value. In practical applications of our method, it is however
necessary to obtain information on both the traders’ real bargaining power and the buyer’s
ability to increase company profits, to achieve reliable price forecasts.
Our results uncover a positive and large correlation between private benefits and the
proportion of nonvoting equity, which cannot be ascribed either to an increase in net worth
or to a decrease in outsiders’ power, because both are controlled for. This correlation
supports the view that the extraction of control rents is socially inefficient (Burkart et al.,
1998a). Other results confirm existing evidence, namely, that private benefits increase with
the value of company assets and are insensitive to leverage. This is consistent with the
twofold nature of debt, which allows the borrower to acquire more assets without losing
control but limits his or her discretion.
Our empirical analysis should be considered as a first application of our new method,
because it uses only one measure of strategic relevance and one specification for both
control benefits and the expected change in profits. Further research should check the
robustness of our estimates by experimenting with available alternatives.Acknowledgements
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